have nothing to do with nude pictures, nor with underwear ads that they consider in poor taste. And a model with a wholesome image might decline to represent a liquor advertiser.

Some models who do not accept other alcohol advertising make an exception for beer. And few feel that a crucial one for black models like Mr. Holmes, because the overwhelming number of jobs available to black models. Also, for advertising ads are for hard liquor, cigarettes and beer.

Other models do not make ads for fur costs. Each of the four modeling agencies quoted. She said it had at least one model who would not pose in furs out of a concern for the rights of animals.

Peggy Dillard, a black model said she had refused for 16 years to accept advertisements for hair straighteners. She also refuses to do advertising for any skin-bleaching creams, or for cosmetics from companies in South Africa.

She said things like lightening creams and straighteners do not reflect well on black people. "I don't want to perpetuate that negative image," she said, "especially while our ethnic characteristics are still being challenged by society."

An editor at one of the models interviewed said they have had misgivings over their choices—none expressed regret over lost opportunities.

"Everywhere where you are, in whatever field, you have to make a stand," said Brenda Jordan, a model with Wilhelmina and a member of Models for Christ. She said she has rejected offers to appear in advertisements for a South African soap product, for cigarettes and for alcohol.

"Even when you break it, you don't have to do anything in this world that you don't want to do," Ms. Jordan said. "The big question is, how am I going to feel about myself in the long run?"

**GREG IFFRIG RECEIVES CONSERVATION AWARD**

**HON. JACK BUECHNER**

**OF MISSOURI**

**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

*Tuesday, July 26, 1988*

Mr. BUECHNER. Mr. Speaker, today I am proud to recognize one of my constituents, Greg Iffrig, who recently received the National Chevron Conservation Award. Greg's accomplishments in developing a park stewardship program through the Missouri Department of Natural Resources distinguishes him as an active and committed conservationist. The Chevron Award is granted annually to professional conservationists, citizen conservationists, and conservation organizations. While Greg enjoys volunteering as a member of the Sierra Club White River Group, his award was as a professional conservationist.

As the Missouri Department of Natural Resources' Natural Areas Coordinator, Greg developed a program to maintain Missouri's savanna natural communities. The first of Greg's preservation programs was established as the Ha Ha Tonka State park. His work over the years to create and preserve the preserve set a high standard as one of our commitments to protecting biological diversity on public lands. It is my honor to represent Greg Iffrig, whose service and attention to the environmental needs of Missouri have helped maintain natural communities throughout the region.

**TOUGHER SANCTIONS AGAINST SOUTH AFRICA**

**HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL**

**OF NEW YORK**

**IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

*Tuesday, July 26, 1988*

Mr. RANGEL. Mr. Speaker, in a July 25 New York Times editorial, the former chairman of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, John Douglas, makes a convincing case for tougher United States sanctions against South Africa.

Attorney Douglas, in his well written editorial, bases his case for tougher sanctions on the premise that those who view the end to apartheid in South Africa as being contingent on that country's economic growth are misreading history. He points out that even in periods of economic growth, the Government of South Africa has severely limited the political freedom of the majority population. He concludes by criticizing the "passive approach" to ending apartheid by those who oppose sanctions—"champions of economic growth"—and calls on the United States Congress to impose comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. I share the views expressed by Attorney Douglas in this editorial, and intend to do all I can to achieve passage in both Houses of Congress of H.R. 1560, the "Anti-Apartheid Act Amendments."

I hope that those of my colleagues who are opposed to tough sanctions against South Africa, as well as those who are uncertain about how best to help end apartheid, will take the time to read this editorial. The time has come for the United States Congress and the Reagan administration to be on record as firmly opposed, in actions, words and deeds, to apartheid in South Africa.

*From the New York Times, July 26, 1988*

**SQUEEZE PRETORIA**

*By John Douglas*

WASHINGTON.—In portraying economic growth as the key to future democracy in South Africa, opponents of comprehensive sanctions misread the history of apartheid. South Africa's experience indicates that economic expansion can be compatible with a sophisticated police state.

Since the current Nationalist Party administration has blocked political participation by blacks and suppressed their protests with naked force, this was true in the 1960's, when the economy grew at a rapid 6 percent; in the 70's, when the rate was 3 to 4 percent; and in the 80's, when, until recently, there has been stagnation.

Indeed, it was in the high-growth 80's that the Afrikaner regime enacted the statutes, including the so-called Terrorism Act, that institutionalized the classic elements of a potential police state—water without warrant, indefinite detention without trial and removal of judicial control over detentions.

Critics of sanctions point to the economic gains in the 80's for some blacks, particularly for small-businessmen, as heralding decisive political influence to come. But this has not been the case. Black entrepreneurs are too few in number and too dependent on the state bureaucracy to even constitute an effective force against apartheid. Today, black-owned businesses account for only 1 percent of the gross domestic product.

For the black population as a whole, the economic base has become a disaster. Blacks own less than 2 percent of the nation's capital stock. The average income of black households has lagged far behind inflation. The unemployment rate for blacks stands at 26 percent and increasing. New jobs average 22,000 a year whereas the work force grows by more than 300,000 annually. Small wonder, then, that the economic advantages of some blacks have not translated into political power.

Opponents of comprehensive sanctions similarly misconstrue the role of black labor unions. Their theory is that, with national union agreements the unions will be able to ameliorate economic power and can then transfer that power to the political arena.

But this formulation views black unions in a wholly ahistorical manner. The black labor federation was long ago institutionalized under the apartheid. It assumes erroneously that the economic aspirations of black workers can be diverted from their political aspirations. The two strands are inseparable, as witness the recent three-day "stay away," called by the largest labor federation, to demonstrate grassroots opposition to apartheid.

The rationale of economic growth also ignores the severity of the constraints under which black unions function. The high black unemployment rate assures a large potential reserve force of unemployed workers. Strikers cannot picket. Most important, union members are no match for the Government's guns, whips and dogs, all of which are at the ready in major labor disputes.

Last year's strike by 340,000 black miners was instructive. Its three-week duration was a remarkable achievement, and ended the National Union of Mine Workers capitulated. Before the strike, the union asked for a one year pay increase of 30 percent. After the strike fire broke, the union accepted the owners' pre-strike offer of 23 percent. The raise was impressive on its face but actually modest, given the 3 to 1 disparity between white and black pay, the average monthly wage of $245 and a 15 percent inflation rate.

During that strike, the security forces of management and the state went on a rampage. Shootings of strikers, assaults and beatings were commonplace. Hundreds of strikers were injured. More were arrested. Nearly 2,000 were killed.

The pattern of white domination has characterized all of South Africa's labor-management relations. In the 80's, the Government, with the help of black leaders, has tried to smash the fledgling black unions. Two decades later, the Government acceded to industry's entreaties and legislated limited types of union activity.

Management made this about face in the interests of efficiency and stability: It was less costly to deal with union representatives than to cope with the larger number of individual workers who were becoming increasingly restive. But then, as now, the black unions operated at the sufferance of the Government.

In contrast to the passive approach exemplified by the champions of economic growth for South Africa, comprehensive sanctions would represent an affirming policy.

Mild selective sanctions, enacted in 1986, have increased slightly the costs of maintaining apartheid. But more intrusive sanctions like vigorous Presidential leadership would encourage other industrial democracies to forge a common policy and would impose significant strains on the economy—primarily, albeit not exclusively, on its white sector. Those strains would resonate with the resistance to apartheid in the black communities and provide the best opportunity for a non-racial democracy.