ACTION MANIFESTO
AS A RESULT OF MY TRIP TO
SOUTH AFRICA, GUINEA-BISSAU AND CAPE VERDE

by

The Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr.
Chairman, Subcommittee on Africa
Committee on Foreign Affairs
U. S. House of Representatives
PROLOGUE

This prologue which is drawn from my Press Statement of September 15, upon my return from the fact-finding mission to several African countries, including Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde and South Africa, is designed to provide a background for this Action Manifesto which consists of a number of recommendations for United States Policy resulting, for the most part, from the trip. In view of the immediacy of concern on the proposed Heath/Smith settlement, and in view of the action which was announced last week by this government of the agreement on the Azores, recommendations have been added on these two subjects.

The visit to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde was extremely informative, both on the stark racism of the Portuguese Government and on the tenuous situation of the Portuguese in Guinea-Bissau. Guinea-Bissau is an armed camp, and the Portuguese are indeed beleaguered. At the same time, it was obvious that a consideration of the effect of the PAIGC must include not only its military gains and its concomitant efforts to improve conditions in the liberated areas, but even the housing, health and educational programs currently being undertaken in the Portuguese-held areas in Guinea and on Cape Verde.

The basic fact which I found on the fact-finding mission to South Africa was the indomitable spirit and the unquenchable will of the people of South Africa to be free. I have returned with the conviction that majority rule in South Africa is inevitable and the rest of the world, particularly the United States, has no choice but to get on the side of freedom.

I am not prepared to start predicting when or how, but the countdown has begun.

Our government, at present, decries violence as a means of liberation, without condemning the violence which the South African Government uses to enforce the subjugation of the majority of the people. The United States must recognize that any means are legitimate so long as the recalcitrance of the South African Government continues.

For, despite some questioning among some of the white elements in South Africa, the situation of the African is worsening. He has no right of political participation in the government, no right of movement, no right to work or even to live with his family. We found no evidence either that the inhuman, all pervasive restrictions on the majority of the people, or that the repressive laws - applicable against anyone, black or white, who opposes the system - are being mitigated one iota. In fact, the resettlement projects, the Terrorism Act trials, the detention, the tortures, the deaths
in detention and the bannings by unchallengable executive fiat continue. The pass laws, under which 2,500 Africans are arrested each day, symbolize the tyranny and the repression.

In my opinion, the United States, as the leading power in the world, must act to avoid the holocaust which will otherwise surely come. The government must reform its own employment practices in its enterprises, including the embassy and consulates in South Africa.

There is positively no justification, under present administration policy, whereunder black foreign service officers are not assigned to South Africa. Such assignments must be made without delay. The city of Soweto has nearly a million blacks, there should be a USIS office there.

In my discussions with various U.S. business managers in South Africa, as well as in my visit to NASA, I found an utter lack of realization that blacks are human beings. The United States Government, in its own enlightened interest, must end its complicity with apartheid, and work towards the peaceful and expeditious termination of minority rule in South Africa.

It is incontrovertible that U.S. business, representing the second largest foreign investment in South Africa and concentrated in the manufacturing and dynamic sectors, buttresses the South African economy and, therefore, the present government and apartheid. Its presence not only renders the U.S. hostage to apartheid, it provides a stake in the status quo. Because of the innumerable policy and legal difficulties in forcing U.S. business to disengage, I am directing present efforts against the exploitation of the blacks by U.S. business, which uses the apartheid system as an excuse for slave labor practices.

The United States Government must use every legitimate means to bring U.S. business to dedicate itself to the principles and effectuation of fair employment practices with respect to wages, training and educational programs, fringe benefits, and special services and programs for the African. American firms must push beyond the limits of the permissible and end their racist practices. The signs - Whites Only - and the segregated facilities and the discrimination in jobs which we witnessed both in U.S. plants in South Africa and at the NASA facility there must be eliminated.

I have long opposed the sugar quota for South Africa, and frankly, I was shocked when I visited the sugar estates and actually witnessed the blatant racism of the Sugar Association and the deplorable conditions of employment for the sugar workers - the wages, the housing, the diet, and the long hours of work.
The potential of a free South Africa, with its tremendous natural, industrial, and human resources for all of its people, indeed, for all of Africa, is unlimited.

South Africa is not isolated from the tide of self-determination and freedom which has revolutionized the world in the middle of this century. Through the Charter of the United Nations, majority rule, self-determination and human rights have become recognized legal obligations of all member countries, including South Africa and the United States. The international community has been transformed from independent powers and dependent areas to communities of sovereign and independent states. This tide of freedom is a surging undertow in South Africa that will overcome.

We must utilize all our resources for its early realization; for although in the final analysis the resolution is coming from the people themselves, external forces and external assistance can make a vast difference in the way in which their freedom will be won.

I have thus issued this Action Manifesto with recommendations to the Secretary of State and to Dr. Kissinger for United States Government action.
INDEX TO SUBJECT MATTER
OF
RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendations

U.S. policy respecting apartheid, self-determination and human rights .......................... 1 - 2
U.S. policy towards efforts to achieve self-determination and violence to thwart such efforts ...... 3 - 4
U.S. contributions to United Nations Trust Fund .......... 5
U.S. policy towards Portugal .......................... 6 - 13
U.S. policy towards liberation forces of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde ................................ 14 - 17
U.S. support of liberation movements and refugees ...... 18 - 19
U.S. policy towards South Africa generally .......... 20
U.S. policy on the Bantustans .......................... 21
U.S. Government enterprises in South Africa .......... 22 - 25
U.S. policy towards U.S. business in South Africa ...... 26 - 32
Export-Import Bank policy towards South Africa .......... 33
Enforcement of statutory prohibition prohibiting importation into the U.S. of goods produced by forced labor .................................................. 34
Sugar Quota for South Africa .......................... 35
Arms Embargo against South Africa ........................ 36
Assignment of military attachés to South Africa .......... 37
Educational and cultural programs for South Africa ..... 38
Legal assistance ............................................. 39
US/SA cooperation in the nuclear field ........................ 40
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Topic</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S. international financial cooperation with South Africa</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa policy towards South Africa</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. policy concerning Namibia</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. policy towards investment in the Portuguese territories</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPIC policy for the minority-ruled areas of Africa</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General reporting requirements for U.S. businesses operating abroad</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geneva Conventions</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. policy towards the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa</td>
<td>48-49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. policy towards investment in majority-ruled states of Africa</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Task Force on Africa</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommendations of UNA Panel on Southern Africa</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. policy towards Zimbabwe</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Azores Agreement</td>
<td>55</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. That the United States take meaningful steps, as spelled out below, (1) to end its complicity with apartheid, (2) to implement its pronouncements of adherence to the principle of self-determination and of abhorrence of apartheid with concrete actions towards their realization, (3) to comply with United States obligations under Articles 1, 2, 55 and 56 of the United Nations Charter, and (4) to act in accordance with the moral and legal standards of the Constitution.

2. That the United States Government show cause why it should not, as an earnest of its position on human rights and self-determination, downgrade its representation in South Africa and Portugal to the Chargé level.

3. That the United States condemn the violence with which the Government of South Africa and Portugal perpetuate their rule in these countries.

4. That the United States cease its condemnation of the efforts by the majority of the people of these areas to achieve their freedom by the only means available to them, and in reaffirmation of the principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence - principles which gave birth to the American Revolution and to the United States of America - acknowledge the sacred right of these peoples to use, so long as the recalcitrance of those governments continues, whatever means are necessary to achieve self-determination and to win their freedom.

5. That the United States contribute to the United Nations Trust Fund. The Fund is made up of voluntary contributions and is used for:

   "(a) Legal assistance to persons persecuted under the repressive and discriminatory legislation of South Africa;
   "(b) Relief to such persons and their dependents;
   "(c) Education of such persons and their dependents;
   "(d) Relief for refugees from South Africa."

(General Assembly Resolution 2397 (XXIII) of 2 December 1968)

The General Assembly Report of October, 1971 listed the following contributions as received during the previous 12 months: Austria, $5,000; Belgium, $20,149; Bulgaria, $1,000; Cyprus, $242; Denmark, $66,796; Finland, $25,000; France, $20,000; Ghana, $1,000; Ireland, $2,750; Jamaica, $840; Japan, $20,000; Khmer Republic, $1,000; Liberia, $1,000; Morocco, $3,972; Norway, $35,000; Pakistan, $3,000; Saudi Arabia, $2,400; Sweden, $77,369; Yugoslavia, $1,000. Note, there was no contribution by the United States.
6. That United States NATO contributions to Portugal should be suspended until Portugal recognizes its obligations under the United Nations Charter with respect to the self-determination of the people of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique, and until Portugal ceases its expenditure of a disproportionate amount of its budget to fight a colonial war in Africa. This recommendation is underscored by (1) the absence of any significant military reason for such contribution (the United States NATO contribution to Portugal amounts to "approximately one-fourth of one percent of Portuguese military expenditures") and (2) Portugal's expenditure of almost 50% of its budget for military purposes.

7. That the United States suspend all sales to the Portuguese armed forces until such time as Portugal takes the two actions specified in Recommendation 6.

8. That again, until Portugal takes the two actions specified in Recommendation 6, the United States suspend all sales to the Government of Portugal or to Portuguese buyers, whether such sales are public or commercial, of the following:

   (a) Aircraft which can be used for troop transport;
   (b) Arms, ammunition, and items of a weapons nature;
   (c) Items for the use of, or by, the Portuguese armed forces;
   (d) Spare parts and third party componentry for any of the above.

9. That United States export licenses for the sale of any of the items listed in the prior two paragraphs be denied. The present arms embargo against Portugal not only raises questions of adequacy of enforcement; it continues a military partnership with Portugal without regard to either Portugal's violations of the rights of the people of those territories or to Portugal's obligations under international law, and indeed without regard to our own obligations under the United Nations Charter. Regulations of the Department of Commerce (validated and G-dest license controls) and State Department (Munitions Control) should be amended accordingly.

10. That the United States suspend all Export-Import Bank facilities to Portugal until such time as Portugal takes the two actions specified in Recommendation 6.
11. That the United States pursue a positive program for bringing Portugal to rethink its obdurate position on Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde.

12. That the United States cease its obstruction of efforts by other NATO countries to place on the agenda an item to reconsider NATO assistance to Portugal and that the United States Government use every effort to have this item placed on the agenda for the next NATO Council meeting.

13. That the United States take whatever steps are necessary, including amending its validated license regulations, to prevent the sale of defoliants to Portuguese buyers.


15. That the United States either bilaterally, or through the United Nations, give humanitarian aid to the PAIGC and other liberation movements. (The feasibility of such aid is attested by the program of the Swedish Government which has an on-going assistance program to liberation movements and, in the calendar year of 1971 will contribute to the PAIGC 1,750,000 kroner in kind for humanitarian or educational purposes).

16. That the United States Government welcome the leaders of the PAIGC and other liberation movements for visits to this country and that United States officials meet with such leaders.

17. That the United States endeavor to get the two sides, the PAIGC and other liberation movements, and the Government of Portugal, together to the conference table on the basis of the Lusaka Manifesto, the principles of which the United States generally endorsed.

18. That the United States support multilateral and/or bilateral programs of humanitarian support to the liberation movements, through the provision of educational and reading materials, as well as medical supplies, to people in the liberated areas and to refugees.

19. That the United States adopt a positive and substantial program of assistance to Southern African refugees.
20. That our foreign policy towards South Africa be completely revamped. Our present foreign policy towards South Africa is based on pronouncements of abhorrence of apartheid on the one hand, and coexistence with, and even support of, its adherents on the other. In our own enlightened interest, this must be changed, and we must come to grips with the fact of change in South Africa due not to the largesse of the whites, but to the determination of the majority to achieve self-determination. To this end, the United States should affirmatively adopt a policy, attuned to and supporting the majority and their rights.

21. That the United States clearly and publicly state the legal position on the Bantustans, namely, that (1) they are illegal under international law, and (2) that international law requires the right of political participation in the Government of South Africa by all the people without distinction as to race, color, sex, language or religion.

22. That the United States establish substantial contact with the majority in South Africa through the opening of USIS offices in Soweto and in other large black communities.

23. That the government reform its own enterprises in South Africa and terminate the apartheid practices I observed there, and that the embassy and consular staffs be integrated at all posts and at all levels in South Africa, and specifically:

(a) That the United States assign black personnel without delay to the embassy and consulate staff and to the USIS staff in South Africa on all levels, and

(b) That local blacks be employed by the diplomatic and consulate staff at each post and in all categories.

24. That guidelines be established for the United States Embassy and Consulate Post for (1) the use of segregated facilities in South Africa, and (2) for entertaining by United States Government personnel on a non-racial basis, and (3) for their attendance at segregated functions. (I cannot accept the position of the Department of State that (a) it gives maximum discretion to our Ambassador in regard to the "delicate problem of having to maintain adequate relations with the authorities while continuing to support and project our abhorrence of apartheid and dedication to multiracial principles" and (b) it permits the Ambassador to exercise "this discretion in tailoring the nature of his
entertainment and that of his staff to fit the needs of the occasion." Under these vague standards, spelled out in Mr. Abshire's letter to me of July 26, 1971, our Ambassador gave a large, segregated reception which has subjected the United States to much criticism in South Africa and in the United States. Our policy interests require the establishment of functional and legal guidelines for embassy, consular and all official United States Government personnel in South Africa as to their participation at official and social functions and their use of segregated facilities).

25. That the agreement with South Africa for tracking stations in South Africa (T.I.A.S. 4562 of September 13, 1960) be terminated according to its terms and, in the interim, (1) that NASA be required to end its apartheid policies and racist practices and (2) that there be no discrimination in either the conditions of labor and employment or in the facilities available to employees. The callous racism and apartheid which I found at the NASA Tracking Station near Johannesburg must be ended.

26. That the role of the Commercial Attaché and Economic Officer be reexamined and their functions of encouraging United States businesses in South Africa be terminated.

27. That the United States Government take a stand against business expansion in South Africa until such time as South Africa ceases its racial policies, and implement effective disincentives to United States business investment in South Africa.

28. That the United States advise businesses that, if they decide to stay in South Africa, they do so at their own risk; and in the event of difficulties with liberation elements, the United States Government will not support them or afford protection.

29. That the United States Government actively and publicly use its power and influence to cause and assist United States businesses in South Africa to:

   (a) Close the communications gap between United States headquarters and their subsidiaries and branch offices in South Africa;

   (b) To pay equal pay for equal work;

   (c) To get on with the task of training and whatever else is necessary so that blacks, coloreds and whites are performing equal work on a substantial scale;
(d) To throw off local coloration and give respect to all employees;
(e) In sum, to establish fair employment practices and to refuse to adhere to racial policies and practices.

30. (a) That Executive Order No. 10925 be amended so that, with respect to those United States businesses in South Africa, fair employment practices in their South African enterprises be a condition for their eligibility for government contracts. I am also planning to introduce legislation for this purpose.

(b) In accordance with Executive Order 10925 requiring non-discrimination by government contractors and in view of Pan-Am's exclusion of Black Americans from its African runs, each United States Government agency having a contract with Pan-Am should review such contract under section 301 (6) concerning sanctions and remedies for noncompliance with the discrimination clause.

31. That an appropriate mechanism be established within the executive departments to investigate the practices of American firms in South Africa, to report to the Executive and Congress thereon, and to advise as to those firms which are not implementing fair employment practices.

32. That the United States Government establish an Honor Roll of those firms who are implementing fair employment practices, and are providing substantial educational, counseling and training for their African employees.

33. That the United States Government end all Export-Import Bank facilities and services for South Africa. As brought out in our hearings of June 3, 1971, at which the Vice President of the Export-Import Bank appeared before the Subcommittee, the following services of the Export-Import Bank are allowable under present guidelines for South Africa:

   (1) Short-term FCIA [Foreign Credit Insurance Association] insurance.
   (2) Medium-term FCIA insurance. As of April 30, 1971, $9,882,000 insurance was authorized.
   (3) Guarantees of loans by United States financial institutions to South African purchasers of United States goods or services.
   (4) Guarantees of loans by non United States financial institutions to South African purchasers of United States goods or services.

Export-Import Bank has informed the Subcommittee that as of April 30, 1971, $20,246,000 guarantees were authorized as medium-term guarantees, but did not indicate the nationality (i.e., United States or South African) of the exporter bank.
Exim discount loans to South African purchasers. In his statement on May 20, 1970, before the Subcommittee, a State Department witness had listed the Exim Bank exposure in South Africa as confined to medium-term and short-term insurance and guarantees, adding that no Exim loans or credits have been issued for transactions with South Africa since 1959. However, four discount loan commitments to South African companies were approved by Exim between October 20, 1969 and February 25, 1971 for export sales to South Africa, indicating a change and relaxation of policy by this Administration. (Two of these transactions were cancelled by the borrowers).

The facilities of the Foreign Credit Insurance Association for insuring political risks in South Africa.

The Export Expansion Facility for insuring higher risks transactions.

Guarantees of non United States loans to cover local costs related to United States purchases.

The re-lending credit program.

The provision by Exim Staff of guidance and information to South African importers and United States exporters to South Africa.

And the availability to South Africa of Exim's program of providing direct loans to a foreign government suffering temporary dollar shortages was not stated outside of present guidelines by the Exim Bank witness before the Subcommittee on June 3.

34. That Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. 1307, prohibiting the importation into the United States of goods produced by forced labor be enforced. This provision reads:

"All goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor under penal sanctions shall not be entitled to entry at any of the ports of the United States, and the importation thereof is hereby prohibited, and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to prescribe such regulations as may be necessary for the enforcement of this provision. The provisions of this section relating to goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured by forced labor or/and indentured labor, shall take effect on January 1, 1932; but in no case shall such provisions be applicable to goods, wares, articles, or merchandise so mined, produced, or manufactured which are not mined, produced, or manufactured in such
quantities in the United States as to meet the consumptive demands of the United States.

"Forced labor," as herein used, shall mean all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily. (June 17, 1930, ch. 497, title III, section 307, 46 Stat. 689)."

35. That the sugar quota for South Africa be terminated; and that in no circumstances should South Africa be permitted an increased allocation so long as the benefits of the quota do not inure to the majority of the people. I personally witnessed the blatant racism of the South African Sugar Association and the deplorable conditions of employment of the workers as to wages, housing, diet, and hours of work. To this end, I recommend:

(a) That the President, acting pursuant to Section 202 (d) (1) (B), suspend the continuation of the sugar quota for South Africa. This section provides:

"(B) Whenever and to the extent that the President finds that the establishment or continuation of a quota or any part thereof for any foreign country would be contrary to the national interest of the United States, such quota or part thereof shall be withheld or suspended, and such importation shall not be permitted. A quantity of sugar equal to the amount of any quota so withheld or suspended shall be prorated to the other countries listed in subsection (c) (3) (A) (other than any country whose quota is withheld or suspended) on the basis of the quotas then in effect for such countries."

(b) That South Africa not be eligible for the benefits of the provisions of Section 202 (d) (2) (A) of the Sugar Act. This section provides:

"(2) (A) Whenever the Secretary finds that it is not practicable to obtain the quantity of sugar needed from foreign countries to meet any increase during the year in the requirements of consumers under section 201 by apportionment to countries pursuant to subsections (b) and (c) and the foregoing provisions of this subsection, such quantity of sugar may be
imported on a first-come, first-served basis from any foreign country, except that no sugar shall be authorized for importation from Cuba until the United States resumes diplomatic relations with that country and no sugar shall be authorized for importation here under from any foreign country with respect to which a finding by the President is in effect under paragraph (1) (B) of this subsection: Provided, That such finding shall not be made in the first nine months of the year unless the Secretary also finds that limited sugar supplies and increases in prices have created or may create an emergency situation significantly interfering with the orderly movement of foreign raw sugar to the United States. In authorizing the importation of such sugar the Secretary shall give special consideration to countries which agree to purchase for dollars additional quantities of United States agricultural products. In the event that the requirements of consumers under section 201 are thereafter reduced in the same calendar year, an amount not exceeding such increase in requirements shall be deducted pro rata from the quotas established pursuant to subsection (c) and this subsection."

36. That the arms embargo against South Africa include:

(a) All sales to, or for, the South African military, including the provision of spare parts, componentry and repairs. The relaxation of the arms embargo by the present Administration to permit certain sales of aircraft to the South African military must be ended.

(b) All sales of light aircraft, military or civilian, destined for South Africa. The significance of this recommendation is indicated by the structure of the South African military forces, in which all physically qualified white males must serve and in which Africans cannot serve — a structure such that the "citizen forces" and citizen "air commandos" form an integral part of the defense force of the country. Thus, planes sold for civilian use are in fact available for military purposes.

(c) Training to South African military, including correspondence courses and participation in conferences.
(d) Cooperation in, and the transfer of, research, development and/or military know-how, including the testing of military equipment. At the Subcommittee hearings of November 12, 1971, the Department of Defense testified that the United States had tested, in the United States, weapons (surface-to-air missiles) developed by joint South African-French participation, while dealing only with the French firm, to which we had provided money for the testing.

37. That the role of the military attaché in South Africa be reviewed and cause be shown why these functions not be terminated. (Note, information supplied by the Department of Defense at the November 12 hearings before the Subcommittee indicated that there are more United States military attachés assigned to South Africa than to any other African country).

38. That the United States institute an expanded educational and cultural program with the South African majority as a primary target and with those institutions and individuals working for change to majority rule as a secondary target.

39. That the United States facilitate private efforts and programs to provide legal and humanitarian assistance to the victims of the repressive legislation of South Africa.

40. United States cooperation with South Africa in the field of nuclear energy should be ended and, in no event, should there be a new agreement or an amendment to the present agreement to provide for an increase in the amount of uranium enriching services which the United States can supply South Africa. (South Africa has allegedly developed a new uranium enrichment process which the Prime Minister estimates (Speech of August 3, 1971) may bring South Africa $336,000,000 a year in foreign exchange). Any support of South Africa in this effort would thus significantly undergird apartheid economically and militarily. South Africa has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Commission has been quoted (RAND DAILY MAIL, 12 April 1971) as saying that:

"With its uranium enrichment process, South Africa is theoretically in a position to make its own nuclear weapons, whereas before, it was not practical to make the bomb from plutonium since that would have to be imported from abroad and the installation would be subject to international inspection."
41. That United States policy in international financial organizations be consistent with a policy of supporting change in South Africa and not of economically undergirding the status quo.

42. That the United States visa policy towards South Africa be based on "quid pro quo" considerations.

43. That, in conformity with the international legal obligations of the United States and in accordance with the acceptance by the United States of the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the "Legal Consequence for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia, notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276," the United States:

(a) Recognize the illegality of South Africa's presence in Namibia and the invalidity of its acts on behalf of and concerning Namibia, and

(b) Refrain from any acts and in particular any dealings with South Africa implying recognition of the legality of, or lending support or assistance to, South Africa's illegal presence and administration of Namibia, and in particular

(1) that United States firms doing business in Namibia not be allowed tax deductions or tax credits for monies paid to the South African Administering Authority (see also (5) (V) below);

(2) that grants, concessions, titles, licenses, privileges or interests of any kind granted by the South African Government in regard to Namibia, Namibian products, goods or property of whatever kind be declared invalid (see also (5) (IV) below);

(3) that the importation of goods originating in Namibia into the United States on the basis of rights or interests purported to be granted by the South African Authority be prohibited;

(4) that the United States not apply the provisions of any treaty with South Africa on behalf of, or concerning, Namibia (see also (5) (III) below);
(5) that the United States implement without delay the recommendations of the American Committee on Africa, as presented to Ambassador George Bush on November 4, specifically those regarding:

(I) American diplomatic and consular accreditation to South Africa;
(II) Preventing South African representation of Namibia in international affairs;
(III) No invocation of treaties extended to Namibia;
(IV) Invalidity of South African concessions and other acts;
(V) Treatment of American businesses in Namibia;
(VI) Political asylum for Namibian refugees;
(VII) Actions which should be taken by the United States through the United Nations.

(c) Cooperation with the legal Administering Authority for Namibia by joining a reconstituted Council for Namibia and seek to implement practical measures to end South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. (See (5) (VII) above).

44. That Recommendations 26 through 32 regarding United States policy and its implementation with respect to United States investment and business involvement in South Africa also be applied to United States investment and business involvement in the Portuguese territories.

45. That all investment-incentive programs of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) in, and for, the Portuguese territories be terminated and that the United States Government adopt an affirmative policy proscribing OPIC programs for the minority-ruled areas of Africa.

46. That American companies operating abroad, directly or indirectly, be required to furnish to the Departments of State, Commerce and Labor and to the appropriate committees of the Congress an annual, detailed comprehensive statement on their employment and wage practices. I also intend to introduce legislation to make this a statutory requirement.
47. That the United States support in the United Nations and all other appropriate forums, as well as bilaterally in our relations with South Africa and Portugal, the application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the freedom fighters, and participants in resistance movements and to the civilian population. The status of, and treatment as, prisoners of war should be accorded to the freedom fighters. The humanitarian provisions of these conventions should be extended to the combatants as well as the civilians in conflicts arising from the struggle for the liberation and self-determination of the minority-ruled areas of Africa.

48. That the United States (1) place increased emphasis on the majority-ruled states of Southern Africa, particularly through economic and technical assistance and educational and cultural programs, and (2) assist their efforts to resist South African domination.

49. That the United States should encourage and assist feasibility studies into the mineral resources of the majority-ruled countries of Southern Africa in order to lessen the dependence of those countries on South Africa.

50. That the United States look for an effective means to encourage greater interest in the majority-ruled states of Africa from United States investors and businesses.

51. That the United States cease its hypocrisy, dissimulation and legal dishonesty and recognize that the situation in Southern Africa is within the purview of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter. This section provides:

"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security."

In order that the Security Council can get on with the task of considering appropriate measures to be taken, the United States must acknowledge that the situation in each of the minority-ruled areas of Africa -- the situation in South Africa, the situation in Namibia, the situation in the Portuguese territories, as well as the situation in Southern Rhodesia -- that each of these presents a threat to the peace.
52. That a Special Task Force on Africa be created:

(a) Composed of ranking members of the Departments of State, Commerce, Defense and other pertinent agencies, and of recognized experts on Africa including member of Congress, academicians, journalists and businessmen;

(b) Charged with the task of making a comprehensive review of our policies towards Africa; and

(c) Established on the principle that its recommendations will be effectively implemented.

53. Finally, that the United States recognize the validity of, and take appropriate action on, the following recommendations and findings of the United Nations Association - United States of America National Policy Panel on Southern Africa:

(a) That "the 'rightness' of any particular course of action should be judged on the basis of its ability to assist in the realization of racial equality and representative government in South Africa"; and thus that "a boycott in sports and a strengthening of exchange programs may both be helpful in promoting change." (page 41 of Panel Report of December 2).

(b) That (in addition to those points made in Recommendation 29) United States businesses in South Africa institute the following:

(1) "providing hot lunches, improved medical care, pension programs, and disability insurance" (page 45);

(2) facilitating the organizing of black workers (page 45);

(3) "that American companies cease making financial contributions to the South Africa Foundation" (page 57);

(4) "that American companies appoint as managers of their South African affiliates only those who are willing to work for change and are committed to the implementation of fair labor practices " (page 46).

(c) "That all United States groups and organizations concerned with apartheid and racial discrimination - and particularly the American labor movement in its tradition of active concern with the betterment of working conditions throughout the world become
concerned with the need for American companies to adopt a program of fair labor practices in their South African operations" (page 47).

(d) "That concerned stockholders take advantage of the annual stockholders' meetings to bring to public light the matter of employment practices and conditions in South Africa" (page 47).

(e) That "each American company operating in South Africa should assess the use to which its products are employed in terms of the government's apartheid policy. Any products used directly or indirectly in support of apartheid or racial discrimination -- particularly those used by the police or military -- should be withdrawn from the South African market" (pages 47-48).

(f) That "United States business should not, within the framework of its own domestic labor practices and in the context of its social responsibility, rely on racially discriminatory labor practices in other parts of the world to make a profit" (page 48).

(g) "That United States banks and other financial institutions refuse to accord any financing to South African Government subsidiaries or to government-sponsored commercial or military projects" (page 48).

(h) "That the United States Government review questions concerning the impact and future of international companies operating in South Africa with other investing nations. The United States might initiate such discussions in GATT and the OECD as well as in the United Nations" (page 50).

(i) That the United States assist the Government of Botswana, Zambia and Tanzania in their programs "for the thousands of political refugees from Southern Africa whose needs are great in terms of housing, education and health care" (page 76).
54. That the United States, cognizant of its obligations under the United Nations Charter, and specifically Articles 1, 2 (2), 25, 55 and 56;

(a) Recognize that the Heath/Smith "Proposals for a Settlement" do not secure to the people of Zimbabwe majority rule, self-determination, human rights or the enjoyment of the totality of their rights as set forth in Article 73 of the United Nations Charter.
(b) Recognize that the situation in Zimbabwe continues to constitute a threat to the peace.
(c) Support the authority of the Security Council with respect to Zimbabwe.
(d) Recognize the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Zimbabwe to secure their rights.
That the United States Government must be required, and is herein called upon, to explain the enormous, unprecedented and anomalous commitments which the United States is making to Portugal in connection with the Agreement to extend U.S. base rights in the Azores - an Agreement under which Portugal is to receive in the next two years (the Agreement expires on February 3, 1974) the following quid pro quo:

- $15 million in P.L. 480 agricultural commodities;
- the loan of a hydrographic vessel at no cost;
- $1 million in drawing rights for non-military excess equipment;
- the waiver of MAAG support payments ($350,000) for the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group) to Lisbon;
- $400 million of Exim loans and guarantees for development projects.

(b) That specifically, the government is called upon to address each of the following points:

1. From the point of view of U.S. interests, the new Agreement with Portugal represents an unusual and anomalous commitment. There is no apparent justification for the quid pro quo in the new Agreement.
   a. The general availability of funds for foreign economic assistance has been diminishing since 1967. In that year, funds for economic assistance totalled $5,120 million. In 1968, they were $4,634 million. In 1969, they were $4,067 million. Last year, they totalled $4,711 million. The Export-Import Bank is an exception to the rule; its funds have been increasing in the last few years. But the question must arise why loans and credit guarantees to Portugal are rising at a moment when federal funds are so scarce, and when total appropriations for economic assistance are falling.
   b. The funds projected for commitment to Portugal are out of all proportion to previous development commitments through the Export-Import Bank to either Europe or Africa. The total of Export-Import Bank loans to Africa in the whole period 1946-1970 was less than $358 million. The total of long-term economic loans to Europe from the same source in that period was only $753.7 million.
   c. The projected commitment is also out of proportion to any previous commitments to Portugal itself. That country received less than $50 million in the whole period from 1946-1970 through the Export-Import Bank. The present Administration is proposing to provide more than four times this amount in the next two years alone.
d. The projected new commitments would constitute a tremendous drain on the funds of the Export-Import Bank. They would represent about 10% of the average annual commitments to all countries from the Bank in the last few years; and this does not even take into consideration the $200 million in Exim credit guarantees.

e. The question which remains to be answered, therefore, and it is a most important question, is why a small nation of 8.6 million people should receive such extraordinary special treatment.

2. The United States, furthermore, is now going through the worst balance of payments crisis in its history. We now have the largest deficit on record. Unemployment has risen to high levels as a consequence of deflationary measures designed to remedy that situation. In this context the Administration has undertaken an Agreement with a small European country which will lead to a substantial increase in the foreign exchange costs of our economic assistance. Again, the question must arise why Portugal should qualify for such special treatment.

3. Total U.S. dollar flows to Portugal and its overseas territories now exceed $400 million. (See Table below). These flows are important to that country's balance of payments. The Administration is now proposing a substantial increase in these flows through the loans provided for in the new Agreement.

Portugal and Overseas Territories:
Gross Flows of Funds
from North America*
(1969, millions of $)

| 1. Imports from Portugal and Overseas Territories | $166 million |
| 2. Freight and Insurance on Merchandise | 3 million |
| 3. Other Transportation | 11 million |
| 4. Travel | 79 million |
| 5. Investment Income | 29 million |
| 6. Other government | 6 million |
| 7. Other private | 24 million |
| 8. Unrequited transfers (pension remittances, etc.) | 89 million |
| 9. Non-monetary Sectors: Direct Investment | 6 million |
| Total | $413 million |

Source: IMF Balance of Payments Yearbook, August 1971, vol. 22

* These figures refer to flows from the U.S. and Canada. U.S. funds account for almost the whole of the total.
4. The Portuguese are now running a trade deficit of just under $500 million. This deficit is, to an important degree, the result of the drain on Portugal's economy created by the pursuit of three colonial wars in Africa. Additional, and substantial, assistance to Portugal in this context will have the effect of helping it to continue those wars at the very moment when it is being forced to consider seriously whether it ought to withdraw from its overseas territories.

5. It should be noted that parts of the new Agreement can easily become open-ended commitments. The expanded commitment under P.L. 480 may well be increased still further when the Agreement is reviewed two years from now. The provision dealing with excess equipment is already open-ended. Secretary Rogers' letter clearly states that $5 million for this purpose is not to be considered a maximum ceiling.

6. Dollar flows to Portugal, from both the private and the public sector, are already on a scale amounting to "economic intervention that might just decide the outcome of the colonial war." The new Agreement increases that indirect assistance by a substantial amount and changes the character of our commitment to Portugal.

7. The political context cannot be ignored. Particularly:
   - the liberation forces control large areas of Angola, east and south of the Central Plateau.
   - in Mozambique the liberation forces control several provinces and operate freely south of the Zambesi River.
   - in Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC have forced the Portuguese to leave the countryside and to retreat to the urban areas and a few scattered military bases.

The obvious effect of the Azores Agreement is to enable Portugal to continue waging the three wars in Africa.

8. There is nothing to indicate that the military value of the Azores is of overriding importance to U.S. security so that it merits such an inordinate expenditure. Further, the fact that the base Agreement remained dormant for the past 10 years (since 1962) indicates this.

9. The injection of huge sums for economic and educational assistance, as well as aid in kind, into the Portuguese economy, in the existing internal situation of considerable domestic unhappiness with, and criticism of, wholly disproportionate budgetary expenditures on colonial wars, will greatly assist the Caetano Government in dampening the domestic antipathy to the wars and thus to continue their prosecution.
(c) That, if the Administration cannot provide a statement of compelling reasons for making this Agreement, it must be considered as admitting that it is the intention of the Administration to directly assist Portugal in waging these wars against the peoples of Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique.

(d) That the United States Government respond to the following questions:

1. What projects were reviewed, or are contemplated for Exim loans?

2. Are these projects in Portugal, that is in so-called "metropolitan Portugal" as distinguished from Guinea-Bissau, Angola and Mozambique.

3. Are similar increases in Exim loans being considered (i) for South Africa, (ii) for majority-ruled African countries?

(e) That, in view of the implications of this Agreement for the United States internally, the Administration explain why this Agreement was entered into by the executive agreement route rather than as a treaty and submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

(f) That the Administration explain the discrepancy between its claimed lack of funds to assist Black business in the United States, with its 23 million Blacks, on the one hand and, on the other, its expenditure of tremendous sums to assist the economy of Portugal, a country with only 8.6 million people, and thus to assist the waging of wars against Black people in Africa. According to its reports to the Congress, the Federal Government is now giving only $213.8 million in loans to minority businesses in this country (including Blacks and Spanish-speaking Americans), whereas the sums projected for Portugal in this Agreement are more than double that amount.